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AND PALESTINE: SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND
TARGETED KILLINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
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Demian Casey*
INTRODUCTION

On a Sunday afternoon in the West Bank city of Hebron, a bullet
from a high velocity rifle passed through the head of fourteen-year-old
Nizin Jamjoum. 1 Nizin was the youngest of nine children and hoped to
become an engineer when she grew up. 2 Her dream was to someday
take a holiday in Mexico. 3 Her family did not know why she dreamed of
vacationing there. Her oldest brother would later say, "she just loved the
idea of taking a holiday in Mexico."4 On the day of her death, Nizin and
her brother Marwan went out to their porch to observe a funeral
procession-turned-riot taking place below. 5 Moments after the bullet
entered her skull, she died in the arms of her brother. That day, Marwan
vowed that "if not today, then maybe tomorrow or after one month, I
will avenge the killing of my sister."6
While tragic, the events that led to Nizin's death were not unusual.
Instead, her death is only a small link in a large chain of events that
come together to form the current Intifada. Five weeks earlier in this
same chain of events, a Palestinian suicide bomber destroyed Egged
Bus 32A in Jerusalem, killing nineteen Israeli civilians.7 Hamas claimed
responsibility. 8 Israel's official retaliation included the missile attack on
the Jerusalem home of one of Hamas' leaders, Salah Shehadeh. 9

* The author would like to warmly thank Professor Donna Arzt for her ongoing guidance
and assistance. He would also like to thank Professor Gregory Fox for his comments on later
drafts.
1. Mitch Potter, Cycle of Violence, a Circle of Grief, TORONTO STAR, July 30, 2002, at
AIO.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mohammed Daraghmeh, Palestinians Defy Curfew in Nab/us Under Noses of Israeli
Soldiers, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, July 29, 2002.
7. Palestinian Detonates Bomb in Israeli Bus, WALL Sr. J. EURO., June 19, 2002, at A2
[hereinafter W.S.J.].
8. Id.
9. Peter Hermann, Mideast's Bitter Cycle of Attacks Renewed; Palestinians Vow
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Shehadeh was the head of the military arm of Hamas in the Gaza Strip
and had been the target of several prior assassination attempts which
were aborted due to the presence of Palestinian civilians. 10 The Israeli
government held Shehadeh responsible for the planning and execution
of terrorist acts which killed dozens of Israeli civilians. 11 The attack
resulted in the death of Shehadeh and fourteen other Palestinian
civilians. 12
In the wake of Shehadeh' s death, gunmen in the West Bank from
the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade retaliated by killing four Israeli settlers in a
drive-by shooting. 13 Among the Israeli dead was twenty one-year-old
Elazar Leibovitz, a resident of the Avraham Avinu settlement located
near Hebron in the West Bank. 14 At the funeral procession held for
Leibovitz the following Sunday in Hebron, mourners from neighboring
settlements erupted into violence.1 5 Moshe Givati, an Israeli Minister's
aide who was present at the funeral, observed that "for some reason they
were all carrying army-issue weapons, and they charged into the
Palestinian houses. That's when the fracas began .... There were long
bursts of fire by the Israelis-into the air and at the houses." 16 One of
the bullets fired during the riot caused Nizin's death. 17
The foregoing events are representative of the thousands of acts
which have formed the violent chain that has marked the al-Aqsa
Intifada. 18 Again and again, the Israeli government assassinates a
Palestinian militant, followed by a retaliatory Palestinian suicide
bombing, followed by another Israeli targeted killing.1 9 Recent events

Revenge for Hamas Leader's Death; 15 Die in Israeli 'Targeted Killing', BALI. SUN, July
24, 2002, at Al.
10. Id.; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Findings Of The Inquiry Into The Death Of
Sa/ah Shehadeh, Aug. 2, 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) [hereinafter Inquiry].
11. Inquiry, supra note I 0.
12. Hermann, supra note 9.
13. Uli Schmetzer, 4 Settles Slain in the West Bank, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 2002, at 3.
14. Nadav Shragai et al., Three Family Members Killed in Attack Near Hebron Friday
Night, HA' ARETZ, July 28, 2002; Periodic Report of the Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of
the Occupied Territories, U.N.G.A.O.R., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/421 (2002)
[hereinafter Periodic Report].
15. Amos Harel and Jonathan Lis, Minister's Aide Calls Hebron Riots A 'Pogrom,'
HA' ARETZ, July 30, 2002; Periodic Report, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.; Potter, supra note 1.
18. See infra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text.
19. See MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL, Resources, Conflict Statistics (Jan. 5, 2005),
available at http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/resources/mrates.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
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show that the chain of violence continues to grow. In March 2004,
Israel launched a missile attack against Hamas' wheelchair-bound
spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as he left a mosque in Gaza
City. 20 The attack killed eight, including Yassin, his bodyguards and
bystanders. 21 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon authorized the attack,
calling Yassin an "archmurderer" committed to "the murder and the
killing of Jews wherever they may be and the destruction of the state of
Israel."22 The following month Yassin's successor Dr. Abdel Aziz
Rantisi was killed by another Israeli missile strike. 23 Hamas retaliated in
August with the suicide bombings of two busses killing sixteen Israelis
and wounding over a hundred. 24 Thus the chain continues while
combatants on both sides attempt to morally and legally justify their
actions. 25
This note examines the legal justifications for these acts under
international humanitarian law, in order to determine whether the law is
sufficient to break the chain of suicide bombings and retaliatory
assassinations in Israel and Palestine. The legal status of the suicide
bombing of Egged Bus 32A and the retaliatory assassination of
Shehadeh are examined as typical instances of violence that have
marked the al-Aqsa Intifada. The attacks are analyzed to determine how
the law should be applied to prevent this violence. Part I provides
background information on the suicide bombing and retaliatory

2005). This note will use the terms "assassination" and "extrajudicial killing" without any
attempt to attach political connotations. The government of Israel holds that "Israel neither
condones nor takes part in 'assassinations' or 'extra-judicial killings' .... [T]hese terms are
derived from spheres unrelated to armed conflict and are blatantly misleading descriptions
of Israel's justified counter-terrorist operations." The Israeli government prefers terms such
as 'targeted killings' or 'preventive, precisely targeted operations."' Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: Palestinian Violence and Terrorism; The
International War Against Terrorism, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa [hereinafter Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, F.A.Q.] (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); Black's Law Dictionary defines
"assassination" as "[t]he act of deliberately killing someone" and "extrajudicial" as
"[o]utside court; outside the functioning of the court system." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
109, 606 (7th ed. 1999). This note follows Black's Law Dictionary's definitions of these
terms.
20. James Bennet, Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2004, at Al.
21. James Bennet, The Mideast Turmoil: Protest; Palestinians Swear Vengeance For
Killing Cleric by Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at Al.
22. Id.
23. Greg Myre, In Loss of Leaders, Hamas Discovers a Renewed Strength, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2004, at 6.
24. Steven Erlanger, Twin Blasts Kill 16 in Israel; Hamas Claims Responsibility, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at A12.
25. See infra Parts III, IV.
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assassination. Part II discusses international humanitarian law relating
to war crimes and crimes against humanity, while Part III analyzes the
legality of suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings under
international humanitarian law. Part IV discusses whether these acts are
properly characterized as war crimes, while emphasizing the role of
accountability in potentially breaking the chain of violence. The note
concludes in Part V with an observation on the importance of respecting
international humanitarian law in conflicts against terrorism.
I. THE ATTACKS OF JUNE 18 AND JULY 23, 2002

The al-Aqsa Intifada, which began on September 28, 2000, is the
second Intifada or "uprising" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first
Intifada began in 1987 and ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords
in 1993. 26 The Intifada arose due to long-term discontent in Palestine
over the Israeli occupation. The second, or al-Aqsa Intifada, began due
to a number of factors. In the run-up to the violence, Palestinian
frustration was rising due to the lack of progress at the Camp David
Accords in the summer of 2000. 27 The issues of the right of return for
Palestinian refugees, the status of East Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the drafting of final borders
reportedly stalled the negotiations. 28 Further, there had been no
improvement in the economic well-being of Palestinians since the Oslo
Accords, the construction of settlements and settler bypass roads
continued, and much of the land that Palestinians believed destined for a
Palestinian State remained under Israeli occupation. 29 On the other
hand, politicians on the Israeli right noted that the Palestinian leadership
was "not educating its people for peace, not collecting illegal weapons
and not acting to reduce incitement against Israel. " 30 In this atmosphere,
Ariel Sharon's visit "demonstrate[ing] Jewish sovereignty" over the alAqsa on the top of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on the September 28

26. THE ECONOMIST, Chronology of the Middle East Conflict, available at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory .cfm?Story_id= 1922472 (last visited Mar.
1, 2005).
27. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Country Reports, Israel/The Occupied
Territories, Nov. 2000, at 43 [hereinafter E.I.U.].
28. Id. at 43-44; Deborah Sontag, And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast
Peace: How and Why it Failed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at Al; BBC NEWS, A History

of

Conflict,

Second

Intifada,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middleeast/03/v3iptimeline/
visited Jan. 28, 2005).
29. E.I.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28.
30. Sontag, supra note 28.
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sparked violent protests, setting in motion the "al-Aqsa Intifada."31
Targeting a bus for a suicide bombing is typical of militant
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians. 32 The organizations which
perpetrate suicide bombings choose locations where they can inflict the
greatest number of Israeli civilian deaths. 33 A senior Hamas leader
noted that "[t]he main thing is to guarantee that a large number of the
enemy will be affected. " 34 In doing so, Hamas tries to achieve the
following goals: promote and publicize their cause, gather new recruits
and terrorize Israel's population. 35 Consequently, buses are a routine
target because they present an opportunity to kill a large number of
Israelis in a single attack.
The June 18, 2002 bombing followed the pattern of targeting
buses. At 7:50 in the morning, Mohammed al-Ral boarded Egged Bus
number 32A in a residential neighborhood of Jerusalem. 36 He was a
student of Islamic law from the Al Faraa refugee camp in the West
Bank. 37 Al-Ral carried a bag filled with nail-studded explosives and ball
bearings which he used to kill his victims. 38 The nineteen victims were
all civilians, mostly school children and people on their way to work. 39
Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 40 Hamas leader Dr. Abdel
Aziz Rantisi promised to halt the attacks if Israel withdrew from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 41 Condemning the attack, the Palestinian
Authority issued a statement promising to make every effort to "find
and stop anyone carrying out [suicide bombing] operations. ''4 2 After
viewing the remains of the bus and the victims' bodies lined up on the
sidewalk at the scene of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
vowed to fight Palestinian terror. 43 Residents of the neighborhood and

31. E.l.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28.
32. E.1.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28.
33. Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against
Israeli Civilians, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ [hereinafter Erased in a
Moment] (last visited Mar. 5, 2005.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide Bombing at Patt Junction in Jerusalem
June 18, 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar 5, 2005).
37. Id.
38. Id.; The bomber's name was reported as Mohammed al-Ghoul. W.S.J., supra note
7.
39. W.S.J., supra note 7.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. BBC News, Jerusalem Bus Bomb Kills 20 June 18, 2002, available at
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right-wing activists protested at the scene of the attack and demanded
that the Israeli government expel Palestinian Authority Chairman
Yasser Arafat. 44 Meanwhile, Israeli security officials met after the
attack, and promised to respond with a "harsh and ongoing widespread
operation focusing on destroying the terrorist infrastructure."45
Hamas leaders are often targets of Israeli extrajudicial killings. 46
Israel has often used targeted assassinations of militants to respond to
Palestinian terrorism. Salah Shehadeh, the head of Hamas' military
wing in the Gaza Strip, was a typical target for Israeli assassination.
Israel openly pursues the policy as part of its fight against terrorism. 47
Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense broadly defined the policy by
explaining: "I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone
has committed or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be
hit. . . . It is effective, precise, and just. "48 The killings are general?;
carried out by an aerial missile attack or through the use of snipers. 9
While Israel's military normally attempts to avoid civilian casualties
during targeted killings, innocent people make up at least 30-35% of the
persons killed in these attacks. 50
The extrajudicial killing of Shehadeh on July 23, 2002 followed
the policy of targeted killings. 51 An Israeli F-16 fighter-jet launched a
missile into Shehadeh' s three-story apartment building, bringing down
the building and several adjacent structures. 52 Fourteen additional
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/middle_east/2050955.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
44. Etgar Lefkovits, 19 Killed In Jerusalem Bus Bombing, JERUSALEM POST, June 19,
2002.
45. Herb Keinon and Margot Dudkevitch, Cabinet: IDF To Respond On Wider Scale,
JERUSALEM POST, June 19, 2002.
46. Amnesty International, Broken Lives-A Year of Intifada, Nov. 13, 2001, at 37,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engMDE150832001 (last visited Jan. 16,
2005) [hereinafter Broken Lives]. The term extrajudicial killing will be defined in Section
IV.
47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, F.A.Q., supra note 19.
48. Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission Established Pursuant to
Commission Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, 57th
Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/20011121 (2001) [hereinafter Report].
49. Id. at 56-58, Broken Lives, supra note 46, at 35-37.
50. Margot Dudkevitch, Halutz Says Targeted Killings Have 85% Success Rate,
JERUSALEM POST, June 25, 2003, at 2. While Israel typically avoids civilian deaths, the IDF
noted that the attacks on Shehadeh proceeded despite intelligence showing that his wife was
present. Id.; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Statistics: Three Years of al-Aqsa
Intifada, available at http://pchrgaza.org/special/statisics.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter Statistics].
51. The attack was unique only because of the unusually large number of civilians
killed.
52. Hermann, supra note 9.
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civilians were killed including a number of children. 53 A joint Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency inquiry found that
"the procedures followed in the IDF operation were correct and
professional, as were the operational assessments."54 However, they
also noted that "if their information had indicated with certainty the
presence of innocent civilians in Shehadeh' s vicinity, the timing . . .
would have been changed."55 Like the suicide bombing of Bus 32A a
month before, the attack resulted in promises of revenge. Mohammed
al-Hweiti, who lived in a building neighboring Shehadeh and whose
wife and children were killed in the attack proclaimed: "Who is the
terrorist now?. . . Now the Israelis will get a reaction. " 56 A Palestinian
militant shouting into a microphone declared: "We are going to go deep
into Israel. We will turn their blood into rivers. We will follow the
Israelis into their homes. Revenge will come very soon. " 57 Hamas
promised a continuation of the chain of violence. On al-Jazeera, senior
Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantissi promised that Hamas would "chase
[Israelis] in their houses and in their apartments, the same way they
have destroyed our houses and our apartments. " 58
The killing of Shehadeh came as a reaction to Hamas' use of
suicide bombers against the Israeli public under his leadership.
However, the attack on Shehadeh, intended to deter future suicide
bombers, has instead resulted in promises of more suicide attacks
against Israelis. These two attacks are but links in a chain of killings
that have left over 3,500 Palestinians and nearly 1,000 Israelis dead
since the start of the lntifada. 59 To stop this cycle, the violent chain of
attacks and reprisals must be broken. The following sections will
analyze the role of international law in breaking this vicious cycle.
II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

International humanitarian law applies in all situations of

53. Hermann, supra note 9.
54. Inquiry, supra note 10.
55. Id.; Keinon and Dudkevitch, supra note 45 (quoting Israeli Air Force Maj.-Gen.
Dan Halutz stating that in the case of the attack on Shehadeh "[ e]ven though his wife was
with him, we opted to carry out the attack").
56. Herman, supra note 9.
57. Id.
58. Suzanne Goldenburg, 12 Dead in Attack on Hamas, GUARDIAN, July 23, 2003,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,761746,99.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005).
59. Middle East Policy Council, supra note 19.
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international and certain domestic armed conflicts. 60 International
humanitarian law constrains the conduct of nations, regardless of
whether a state of war exists. 61 Therefore, to show that international
humanitarian law applies to the conflict between Israel and Palestine,
the status of the conflict and the parties to the conflict must first be
determined to allow an examination of individual war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
Originally, the law of international armed conflict applied only to
armed conflicts between States. 62 International humanitarian law
relating to the conduct of war developed from the 1907 Hague
Convention and the four 1948 Geneva Conventions and their two
Additional Protocols. 63 While the Hague Convention of 1907 states that
its provisions apply only during times of war, in practice the
Convention is applied in all international armed conflict. 64 Likewise, the
Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians Persons in
Time of War (hereinafter "Geneva IV") applies "to all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them. " 65 Over time, the law has broadened to
include guerrillas fighting in wars of national liberation and under
military occupation. 66 Additionally, as is the case in the occupied
Palestinian territories, Geneva IV governs "all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance. "67 The Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 on the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter "First Additional
Protocol") more broadly to encompass the "situations referred to in
[Geneva IV, including] armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation... "68 Accordingly,
60. Christopher Greenwood, Scope ofApplication of Humanitarian Law, in HANDBOOK
OF HUMANITARIAN LAWIN ARMED CONFLICTS 39, 42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
61. Id.
62. Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Oxford University Press, 2001).
63. Id. at 330.
64. Hague Convention (IV) concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague Convention], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
lawofwar/hague04.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); Greenwood supra note 60 at 39.
65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm (last
visited Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Greenwood, supra note 60, at 52.
66. Greenwood, supra note 60 at 332.
67. Geneva IV, supra note 65.
68. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the
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Geneva IV and the First Additional Protocol apply in cases of military
occupation of territory. 69
Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories since the end of the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, 70 in which Israel replaced Jordan and Egypt as
the power controlling the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 71 Although
Egypt, Israel and Jordan are all parties to the four Geneva Conventions,
the Conventions apply regardless of the States' status as parties because
the Conventions have crystallized into customary international law. 72
The Conventions' status as customary international law is evidenced by
the fact that every one of the 191 member States of the United Nations
has ratified the Geneva Conventions. 73 There is also a very strong
argument that both Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have
crystallized into customary international law. 74 These reasons include
the fact that governments, United Nations bodies and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regularly invoke the Protocol
during armed conflict. 75 Additionally, 163 States, including four of the
five permanent members of the Security Council, have ratified the
Protocol. 76
The actions of the international community also demonstrate that
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art.
1, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm (last visited on Mar. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Protocol I). The Commentaries define the "expression 'alien occupation' in the
sense ... as a State." Id.
69. It should be noted that under Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol, neither the
Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols apply to "situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature ... " Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
June 8, 1977, art. 1, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2005).
70. United Nations Department of Public Information, The Question of Palestine & The
United Nations, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
71. Id.
72. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in HANDBOOK
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 23-24 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
73. International Committee of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions
and
their
Additional
Protocols
(June
3,
2003),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/party_gc (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
74. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States:
A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 93-95 (2001).
75. Id. at 93.
76. International Committee of the Red Cross, Material on International Humanitarian
Law, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The only
permanent member of the Security Council that has not ratified the Protocols is the United
States, although it is a signatory. Id. Nevertheless, the United States requires its military to
comply with much of the Protocols; Scharf, supra note 74, at 94.
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the Geneva IV applies to the conflict in the occupied Palestinian
territories. There is a great number of United Nations Security Council
and General Assembly Resolutions calling upon Israel to observe the
Convention, while carrying out its occupation. 77 Additionally, the
ICRC, the organization imbued with the status of third-party monitor
under Articles 30 and 143 of Geneva IV, has declared that the entire
document is applicable to the occupied territories. 78 The ICRC
declaration of the Convention's applicability is particularly noteworthy
because of the organization's longstanding reluctance to make political
statements. 79
Israel has denied that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to its
occupation of the Palestinian territories. 80 Rather, the Israeli government
claims to abide voluntarily by the humanitarian aspects of the
Convention. 81 Israel has advanced the "missing reversioner" theory,
arguing that the Geneva IV does not apply where the occupying power
has not displaced a legitimate sovereign. 82 The term 'reversioner'
signifies a party state to which the territory reverts to after the cessation
of hostilities. The theory contends that neither Egypt in the Gaza Strip,
nor Jordan in the West Bank, were legitimate sovereigns or
"reversioners" because of their alleged unlawful aggression during the
1948-49 Arab-Israeli war. 83 For that reason, Israel does not "occupy"
the West Bank and Gaza, but instead "administers" the territory in the
absence of a legitimate sovereign. 84 Thus, Israel should not be held
accountable under the Geneva Convention nor under the law of
occupation generally. 85 This argument is sometimes supplemented with
an additional theory that Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip is the result of a "defensive conquest" which grants legal title to an
occupying power acting defensively where there is an absence of a

77. See Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 97-98 (2003) ).
78. Id. at 99.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 92-93.
82. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 ISR. L. Rev. 279 (1968); Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of
International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, in
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE . ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 131 (Emma
Playfair ed., 1992).
83. Falk & Weston, supra note 82, at 131.

84. Id.
85. Id.
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legitimate sovereign. 86
The missing reversioner theory has enjoyed little support from
scholars or from the international community. 87 First, if the theory were
accepted, it would allow any belligerent occupier to avoid the
requirements of occupation under the Geneva IV by questioning the
validity of the land claim of the state that previously possessed the
territory. 88 The theory also requires one to accept that because the
Palestinians were subjected to Jordanian and Egyptian aggression in
1948, they may therefore be further victimized by Israel. 89 Such a result
contradicts the object and purposes of the Geneva Convention of
protecting civilian populations in time of war. 90 Second, the concept of
a "defensive conquest" must be rejected, as it violates the peremptory
norm of international law that a territory cannot be obtained through the
use of force. 91
International humanitarian law applies to both Israeli and
Palestinian aggression during the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada. As a
State actor, Israel is obliged to follow customary international law,
including humanitarian law. Likewise, national liberation movements
are subject to international rights and obligations where the movement
has international legitimization based on the principle of selfdetermination, and where the movement strives to gain control over
territory. 92 Where a Palestinian liberation movement meets these two
conditions, they enjoy limited legal personality and are subject to the
attendant obligations of international humanitarian law. 93
By examining the international humanitarian law applicable to the
attacks of June 18 and July 23, 2002, one can then determine whether
the attacks were either war crimes or crimes against humanity.
A. War Crimes
War crimes are serious violations of the international humanitarian
law, which regulates armed conflict and includes both Hague and
Geneva law. 94 In Prosecutor v. Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), the
86. Falk & Weston, supra note 82, at 131.
87. Imseis, supra note 77, at 95.
88. Id. at 95-96.
89. Id. at 96.
90. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 2 & art. 3, para. 1; Imseis, supra note 77, at 95-96.
91. U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 4; Cassese, supra note 62, at 256-57.
92. Cassese, supra note 62, at 76.
93. Id. at 76-77; see infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion on the Palestinian Authority's
and Hamas' status as a national liberation movement under international humanitarian law.
94. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2003).

Published by SURFACE, 2005

11

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 6

322

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 32:311

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
stated that war crimes must consist of '"a serious infringement of an
international rule,' i.e., 'a breach of a rule protecting important values,
and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim. "'95
Additionally, "the rule violated must either belong to the corpus of
customary law or be part of an applicable treaty."96 Finally, "the
violation must entail, under customary or conventional law, the
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. "97
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court identifies
violations of international humanitarian law which qualify as war
crimes, and it also identifies the elements of these acts. 98 While the
Rome Statute is not considered to be customary law, these elements of
crimes are drawn from sources which are customary international law,
namely the Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols. 99 This subsection focuses upon those war crimes
identified under Article 8 of the Rome Statute which are applicable to
suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings: Article 8(2)(a)(i), the war
crime of willful killing; Article 8(2)(b)(i), the war crime of attacking
civilians; and Article 8(2)(b)(iv), the war crime of excessive incidental
death, injury or damage. 100
The elements of the war crimes discussed below are customary
international law, which has been applied in international criminal
tribunals. The ICTY stated the three general elements of a war crime
under customary international law. 101 First, the act must be committed
during armed conflict. 102 Second, the act must be a serious violation of

95. CASSESE, supra note 94; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment,
at para. 94 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeaVdecisione/51002.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
96. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 94.
97. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
98. Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force
Jul. 1, 2002), 37 I.L.M. 399, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm
(last visited Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
99. Hague Convention, supra note 64; Geneva IV, supra note 65; See Scharf, supra
note 74, at 91-98 for a discussion of the customary nature of the ICC's provisions on war
crimes.
100. Rome Statute, supra note 98.
101. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45 (June 14, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar
5, 2005); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at para 258 (Dec. 10, 1998),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar
5, 2005).
102. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at para. 258.
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customary international law. 103 Finally the act must be sufficiently
connected to the international armed conflict. 104
This note uses the definitions of the elements of war crimes as laid
out by the International Criminal Court in the Elements of Crimes text
and adopts the ICTY's general elements of an act considered a war
crime under international law. Under the Elements of Crimes text, the
last two elements of each war crime remain the same: "[t]he conduct
took place in the context of and was associated with an international
armed conflict" and "[t]he perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict." 105
The first of these satisfies two of the ICTY general elements of a war
crime, i.e., that the act be committed in armed conflict, and that the act
be connected to the armed conflict. 106 The second establishes part of the
requisite mens rea of the actor, which requires that the actor possess
knowledge of the existence of a State of armed conflict. 107 The
remainder of this subsection will examine the first three elements of the
war crimes for the Elements of Crimes text. These are the elements
which show that the criminalized act is a serious violation of customary
international law.
1. Willful Killing
The Rome Statute details three elements for the war crime of
willful killing, which demonstrates that the act being criminalized is a
serious violation of customary international law:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or
more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual

103. Hague Convention, supra note 64; Geneva IV, supra note 65; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 9th Sess., 3 l 75th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statuteapril04-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-1711, at para. 168.
104. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45.
105. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crime, ICC-ASP/1/3, art. 8(2)(b)(i),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsofcrimes.html (last visited
Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Elements of Crime].
106. Id.; Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45; Furundzija, Case No. IT-9517/1, at para. 258.
107. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 9.
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circumstances that established that protected status. 108
The term "willful killing" comes directly from Geneva IV. 109 The
killing of protected persons is a grave breach of the Geneva Convention
under Article 147. Protected persons are defined as "those who at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." 110 Additionally, the
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is an absolute prohibition
on "[v]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds ... [of
persons] taking no active part in the hostilities." 111
2. Attacking Civilians

The war crime of attacking civilians is a serious violation of
international law, which the Rome Statute describes as:
1. the perpetrator directed an attack;
2. the object of the attack was a civilian population as
such or individual civilians not taking direct part m
hostilities;
3. the perpetrator intended the civilian population as
such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
to be the object of the attack. 112
Directing an attack against civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities is restricted under Articles 48 and 51 of the First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which grants civilians a "general
protection against dangers arising from military operations." 113 The
general prohibition merely codifies "pre-existing customary law,
because the principle of distinction belongs to the oldest fundamental
maxims of established customary rules of humanitarian law." 114 Civilian
status is not inalienable. Article 51 of the Additional Protocol states,
"Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and

108. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(a)(i).
109. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 147.
110. Id. at art. 4.
111. Id. at art. 3.
112. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
113. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(1).
114. Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 120 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
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for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 115 However, taking
part in hostilities only causes a temporary loss of protection under
humanitarian law, and therefore civilians "cannot be killed at any time
other than while they are posing an imminent threat to lives." 116
3. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage
The final war crime discussed is excessive incidental death, injury
or damage. It is a serious violation of customary international law and
is explained in the Rome Statute as:
1. the perpetrator launched an attack;
2. the attack was such that it would cause incidental
death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment and that such death, injury or damage would be
of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
3. the perpetrator knew that the attack would cause
incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment and that such death, injury or damage
would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated. 117
Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions protects civilians from indiscriminate attacks, which
includes attacks "not directed at a specific military objective" attacks
"which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective" and attacks "which employ a method or
means of combat [that] are of a nature to strike military objects and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction." 118 The third element
listed is taken from Article 51 (5)(b) of the First Additional Protocol
which lists the types of attacks considered indiscriminate. 119 Among

115. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(3).
116. Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its
Policy of Assassinations, AI
Index:
MDE
15/056/2003,
available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
117. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
118. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(4).
119. Id. at art. 51(5)(b).
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these are attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 120
Therefore, under international humanitarian law, there is a
fundamental principle of proportionality which limits what may be
considered a military target, and limits attacks on some targets that
could otherwise be justified by a claim of "military necessity" if there is
an expectation that civilians will be harmed. 121

B. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity derive from international human rights
law. 122 Crimes against humanity are prohibitions of conduct which harm
the entire international communi1?; and which, by their prohibition,
protect fundamental human rights. 23 These crimes carry a stigma that
distinguishes them from war crimes. In holding that a German S.S.
officer was guilty of war crimes, but that his actions were not crimes
against humanity, the Dutch Court of Cassation in Albrecht stated that
[C]rimes of this category are characterized either by their
seriousness and their savagery (barbaarsheid), or by their
magnitude, or by the circumstance that they were part of a
system designed to spread terror (een system van
terreurhandelingen ), or that they were a link in a deliberately
pursued policy against certain groups of the population. 124
Therefore, acts which qualify as crimes against humanity under
customary international law must be grave, and are considered }us
cogens. 125
Professor Cassese observes that all crimes against humanity share
the following traits: the act must consist of particularly serious attack on
human dignity; the attacks must be widespread-as opposed to isolated

120. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(5)(b).
121. Oeter, supra note 114.
122. CASSESE, supra note 95, at 64-65.
123. Id.
124. Jn re Ahlbrecht, Annual Digest of Public International Law, vol. 16 Int'l L. Rep.
396, quoted in CASSESE, supra note 94, at 65.
125. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 512-13 (1990)
(discussing the nature ofjus cogens and crimes against humanity).
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or sporadic events; and the victims of the crimes must be civilians. 126
Additionally, these acts are prohibited under humanitarian law
regardless of whether they occur during armed conflict. 127
The list of crimes against humanity contained within Article 7 of
the Rome Statute reflects customary international law. The crimes listed
are:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3 or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health. 128
These offenses reflect the evolution of customary humanitarian

126. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; cf Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at para. 660 (May 7,
1997); Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European
Axis,
art.
6(c),
Aug.
8,
1945,
at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005);
ICTY, supra note 103, art. 5(g); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) , available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) (providing
examples of the characteristics of crimes against humanity).
127. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; Scharf, supra note 74, at 88.
128. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 7.
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law, which originated with the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg following the Second World War. 129 The acts criminalized
under Article 7 are derived from the acts criminalized under the statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 130
The crime against humanity relevant to the attacks of June 18 and
July 23, 2002 is murder. The crime against humanity of murder has
three elements under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. 131 These
elements are:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population. 132
These elements reflect the traits of crimes against humanity under
customary international law discussed by Cassese. 133 Like Cassese's
first requirement that the attack be a particularly odious offense, an
attack causing murder is perhaps the most serious attack on human
dignity. 134 The second element requires that the attacks be widespread
or systematic, as opposed to isolated or sporadic events and also
requires that the victims of the crime are civilians. 135
The third element clarifies the requisite mens rea of a crime against
humanity. Crimes against humanity are distinguished from war crimes
by the requirement that the actor have "knowledge that the offences are
part of a systematic policy or of widespread and large-scale abuses." 136
Crimes are considered systematic or widespread where they involve
"the manifestation of a policy or a plan drawn up, or inspired by, States
authorities or by the leading officials of a de facto state-like
organization, or of an organized political group." 137 M. Cherif Bassiouni
elaborates on this point, arguing that the "widespread or systematic"

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See CASSESE, supra note 94 at 74-81, 91-94.
Scharf, supra note 74, at 89.
Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 7(1)(a).
Id.
CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id at 82.
Id at 64.
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requirement is the international or jurisdictional element raising the
crime from a national to an international violation. 138 Bassiouni further
notes that, as used under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the terms
"widespread or systematic" serve two purposes. 139 "The first is to
eliminate spontaneous or uncontrolled group conflict from the scope of
the crime. The second is to reflect the existence of "[S]tate action or
policy" by State actors and the element of "policy" for non-State
actors. 140 Therefore, under the third element, the actor must be acting
under the color of a de facto State organization and intend for his or her
actions to cause multiple murders of civilians. 141 Consistent with
international practice, there is no requirement that the conduct take
place during armed conflict. 142
Ill. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO THE
ATTACKS OF JUNE 18 AND JULY 23, 2002

Thirty five lives were lost during the attacks on June 18 and July
23, 2002, yet there has been no prosecution of the perpetrators of these
acts. 143 Meanwhile, the chain of violence has continued. Determining
whether these attacks are violations of international humanitarian law
may provide the international community another tool to help break the
chain of conflict, by establishing the grounds ·for trying those who
perpetrate these attacks.
A. The Attack ofJune 18

The suicide bombing of a bus in residential Jerusalem perpetrated
by Hamas on June 18, 2002 claimed twenty lives. 144 This subsection
asks whether the act was a war crime or crime against humanity under
customary humanitarian law as delineated in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.

138. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 24346 (2d rev. ed., 1999).
139. Id. at 244-45.
140. Id. at 245.
141. Id. at 244-45; CASSESE, supra note 94, at 92; Elements of Crimes, supra note 105,
art. 7(1)(a).
142. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; Scharf, supra note 74, at 88.
143. Palestinian Authority security personnel are regularly lax in their investigation and
prosecution of those involved in terrorist attacks against Israelis. Israel has not, as of
writing, prosecuted anyone for the civilian deaths in the attack the Shehadeh. See generally,
Erased in a Moment, supra note 33.
144. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide Bombing at Patt Junction in
Jerusalem, supra note 36.
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1. Was the Attack ofJune 18, 2002 a War Crime?

Under the Rome Statute, each war crime shares two elements, i.e.,
that the conduct took place during international armed conflict and that
the perpetrator was aware of the existence of an armed conflict, such
that his or her actions "took place in the context of and was associated
with" the conflict. 145 The drafters noted that the term "international
armed conflict" includes occupation. 146
Israel has argued that the al-Aqsa Intifada constitutes international
armed conflict due to the number and orchestration of the attacks. 147
The Palestinians have argued that the conflict should be classified as an
uprising against an occupying power. 148 Either sides' characterization of
the conflict is irrelevant because the conflict takes place in territory
occupied by an "alien" power under Geneva IV and the First Additional
Protocol. 149 Therefore, civilians caught in the conflict are protected and
combatants are bound under international humanitarian law. 150
While not a sovereign State, the Palestinian Authority does have
security and legal obligations under the Oslo Accords. 151 Under the
Accords, the Palestinian Authority is obliged to maintain security and
public order in the West Bank and Gaza, and to "apprehend, investigate
and prosecute perpetrators· and all other persons directly or indirectly
involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement." 152 Palestinian
Authority security forces are required to ensure respect for humanitarian
law in territory under their control, and are specifically required to act to
prevent violence and terror. 153 Further, under the law of State
responsibility, States are responsible for conduct the State could control
or for conduct the State allowed to occur. 154 Failure to prevent a terrorist

145. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8.
146. Id.
147. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of
Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, U.N. ESCOR, Supp.
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/1
(1998),
available
at
No.
3
at
38,
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/UN/1998/ResOOl.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
148. Id.
149. See supra Part II; see also Protocol I, supra note 68 (discussing the use of the term
"alien occupation").
150. See supra Part II; see also Protocol I, supra note 68 (discussing the use of the term
"alien occupation").
151. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept.
28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., Art. XII-XV, at http://www.mfa.gov.il (last visited Mar. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Interim Agreement]; Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 44.
152. Interim Agreement, supra note 151, Annex I, Art. Il(3)(c).
153. Id. at art. II.
154. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
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act, which the Palestinian Authority had the ability to stop, would make
the Authority's leadership responsible for the act. 155
Although the Palestinian Authority is not a State, the principles of
State responsibility contained within the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter
"Draft Articles") should apply by analogy because the Palestinian
Authority has quasi-governmental powers and was established in order
to become the future government of a Palestinian State. The quasigovernmental status of the Palestinian Authority is not discussed in the
Draft Articles. 156 The Palestinian authority is an official authority
recognized by Israel and the international community, thus Article 9' s
provisions on "[c]onduct carried out in the absence or default of the
official authorities" do not apply. 157 The Commentaries state, "Article 9
deals with the exceptional case of conduct in the exercise of elements of
the governmental authority by a person or group of persons acting in the
absence of the official authorities and without any actual authority to do
so." 158 Other Articles attributing the conduct of an organ of a State to
the State do not apply as the Palestinian Authority is not an organ of the
State of Israel. 159 However, under Article 10(2) of the Draft Articles,
their obligations will apply retrospectively if and when the Palestinian
Authority becomes the legitimate government of the Occupied
Territories. 160 The Commentaries further state, "Article 10 deals with

Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10,
(2001)
chp.
IV .E.1,
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibility_articles(e).pdf
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
155. Id.
156. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the TwentyFirst Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 799 (2002) (noting that the Draft Articles "do not deal
sufficiently with the right of individuals and non-state entities to invoke the responsibility of
states").
157. Draft Articles, supra note 154, at art. 9.
158. Int'l Law Comm'n, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp. No. 10, at 109,
U.N.
Doc.
A/56/10
(2001),
chp.IV.E.2,
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibility_commentaries(e). pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Commentaries to Draft Articles].
159. Draft Articles, supra note 154, art. 4-6 (defining a "State organ" as "all the
individual or collective entities which make up the organization of the State and act on its
behalf."); see also Commentaries to Draft Articles, supra note 158, at 44. Without doubt,
the Palestinian Authority does not act on behalf of Israel.
160. Draft Articles, supra note 154, art. 10(2) (requiring that "[t]he conduct of a
movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the
territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered
an act of the new State under international law").
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the special case of attribution to a State of conduct of an insurrectional
or other movement which ... succeeds in establishing a new State." 161
Therefore, the obligations of a State under international law apply to the
Palestinian Authority either by analogy, or assuming ultimate
Palestinian statehood, eventual actuality.
These obligations extend to other organized factions, including
militants such as Hamas who are party to the conflict. 162 Hamas should
be considered bound by international humanitarian law because the
organization falls under the definition of a national liberation
movement. 163 That definition requires that international legitimization
of the movement's goals (as opposed to legitimization of the
movement's actions) be based on the principle of self-determination,
and that the movement strive to gain control over territory. 164 Under the
Hamas Covenant, the organization aims to return the Palestinian
occupied territories to Palestinian control. 165 Other militant factions,
such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Islamic Jihad also purport the
goal of Palestinian independence (again, a legitimate goal of an
organization, but it does not legitimatize the organization's methods). 166
Therefore, perpetrators who are part of organized Palestinian militant
organizations, such as Hamas, and commit serious violations of
customary international law have committed war crimes as defined by
the Rome Statute.
Hamas is an organized Palestinian militant organization.
Additionally, Hamas claimed responsibility after the attack on June 18,
2002. 167 The attack was part of a military strategy which aims to force
an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for
the suspension of further attacks. 168 Thus, serious violations of
customary international law committed by Hamas are war crimes.
The remainder of this subsection will determine whether the attack
of June 18, 2002 was a serious violation of international humanitarian

161. Commentaries to Draft Articles, supra note 158, at 112.
162. See CASSESE, supra note 94, at 76; see Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 47.
163. See CASSESE, supra note 94, at 76.
164. Id.
165. The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Aug. 18, 1988, art. 9-11, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
166. See BBC NEWS, Profile: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1760492.stm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also
BBC NEWS, Who are Islamic Jihad?, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/
1658443.stm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
167. W.S.J., supra note 7.
168. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 16.
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law, and if so, whether the attack should be considered a war crime.
i. Willful Killing

The war crime of willful killing requires that the perpetrators, the
Hamas members who planned the attack and supplied Mohammed alRal with explosives, intended on killing one or more protected persons
who belonged to an adverse party to the conflict. 169 Humanitarian law
broadly defines protected persons as those who "at a given moment and
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a P~ to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals." 1 0 Israeli civilians fall within the class
of "enemy nationals" vis-a-vis Palestinian militants, and as such are
considered protected persons. 171 When the Israeli civilian passengers
boarded Bus 32A shortly before 7:50 on the morning of June 18, they
found themselves in the hands of the Palestinian militant organization
Hamas. Therefore, Hamas' planning of an attack which intentionally
caused the deaths of nineteen Israeli civilians was an instance of the war
crime of willful killing.
ii. Attacking Civilians

The war crime of attacking civilians requires the perpetrators to
intentionally direct an attack on civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities. 172 In the instance of the bombing of Bus 32A, the intent to
kill civilians is shown by the choice of tarTet and timing, as well as
Hamas' claim of responsibility for the attack. 73
The late Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmad Yassin argued that
Israelis are not civilians under the international humanitarian law. 174
Sheikh Yassin claimed that:
The Geneva Convention protects civilians in occupied
territories not civilians who are in fact occupiers. [All
Israelis] are criminals. They took my house and my
169. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, at art. 8(2)(a)(i).
170. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 4.
171. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Commentaries, art. 4, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Mar. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Convention on Protection of Civilians in War]. The Commentaries state that
"there are two main classes of protected persons: (1) 'enemy nationals' within the territory
of the Parties to the conflict and (2) 'the whole population' of occupied territories .. ."Id.
172. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(i).
173. W.S.J., supra note 7.
174. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 44.
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country. The soldier who attacks us, the pilot who bombs
us, where do they live? All of Israel . . . is occupied
Palestine. So we're not actually targeting civilians-that
would go against Islam. 175
This argument is unconvincing. Under Article 50(1) of the First
Additional Protocol, a civilian is someone who is not a member of an
organized armed force or a party to a conflict. 176 The general rule is a
presumption that "[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that
person shall be considered to be a civilian." 177 As previously stated,
civilians are protected by the Convention only for such time as they do
not take a direct part in hostilities. 178 However, taking part in hostilities
only causes a temporary loss of protection under humanitarian law .179
For example, the civilians taking part in the fracas which resulted in
Nizin's death lost their protected status only for such time as they
engaged in the hostilities. Therefore civilians "cannot be killed at any
time other than while they are posing an imminent threat to lives. " 180
Thus, the Israelis on Bus 32A were civilians under humanitarian law
and the attack upon them was a war crime.
iii. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage

The attack of June 18 also satisfies the elements of the war crime
of excessive incidental death, injury or damage. The crime requires that
the perpetrator has launched an attack with the knowledge that the
attack would "cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects ... [to] such an extent as to be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated." 181 This crime "reflects the proportionality requirement
inherent in determining the legality of any military activity undertaken

175. Flore de Preneuf, No Israeli Targets Off-Limit, Hamas Spiritual Chief Warns, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/081101/
news_pf/Worldandnation/No_Israeli_targets_of.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also
Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 54-55.
176. Protocol I, supra at note 68, art. 50(1); Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 54.
177. Protocol I, supra at note 68, art. 50(1).
178. Id. at art. 51(3).
179. Id.
180. Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its
Policy ofAssassinations, AI Index: MDE 15/056/2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
print/ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
181. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv).
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in the context of an armed conflict."Isz The attack on Bus 32A was
launched with more than the knowledge that the target was a civilian
object and that incidental civilian death would occur. The perpetrators
intended to kill a great number of civilians. For Hamas' leaders
choosing their targets, "[t]he main thin~ is to guarantee that a large
number of the enemy will be affected," s3 the "enemy" in the instant
case being Israeli civilians. Is4
Hamas has justified its targeting of civilians by arguing that they
do not have the resources to fight for the Palestinian cause by any other
means. Iss Two months after the attack on Bus 32A, Hamas
spokesperson Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi stated:
We don't have F-16's, Apache helicopters and
missiles. . . . They are attacking us with weapons against
which we can't defend ourselves. And now we have a
weapon they can't defend themselves against. ... We believe
this weapon creates a kind of balance, because this weapon is
like an F-16. Is6
Acceptin~ this argument would render international humanitarian law
useless. Is In nearly every war, one side has greater military resources
than the other. Iss This inequity in milita~ strength does not remove the
prohibition against attacking civilians. Is Attacking Israeli civilians in
order to gain a military advantage by forcing a withdrawal from the
Occupied Territory is an instance of the war crime of excessive
incidental death, injury or damage.

2. Was the Attack ofJune 18 a Crime Against Humanity?

The crime against humanity applicable to the June 18 attack is
murder. The Rome Statute provides three elements of the crime against
humanity of murder. The attack on Bus 32A, which killed twenty
civilians satisfies the first, that "[t]he perpetrator killed one or more

182. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv).
183. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33.
184. See text supra Part III.A. I .ii.
185. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 56.
186. Molly Moore & John Anderson, Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military
Balance, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at A 01; Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 57.
187. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33 at 57.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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persons." 190 The attack of June 18 also fulfills the second element, that
the attack "was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population." 191 As discussed above, Hamas
systematically targets Israeli civilians in retaliation to Israeli conduct. 192
Additionally, the frequency of these attacks demonstrates that they are
part of a widespread military strategy. 193 Finally, the third element
requires the perpetrators to have the mens rea of knowingly carrying out
these attacks in a widespread or systematic nature. 194 As noted by
Bassiouni, the term "widespread or systematic" both excludes
spontaneous or uncontrolled grour conflict and requires the element of
"policy" for non-State actors. 19 The attack of June 18 was not
spontaneous or an uncontrolled group conflict, but a planned attack
against civilian as a matter ofpolicy. 19 Therefore, the June 18 attack by
Hamas on Bus 32A was an instance of the crime against humanity of
murder.
B. The Attack ofJuly 24

The targeted killing of Shehadeh on July 23 left fifteen Palestinians
dead. 197 The attack was part of Israel's policy of retaliating against
Hamas terrorism by assassinating those militants believed to be
responsible. 198 This subsection determines whether the July 23 attack
was a war crime or a crime against humanity.
1. Was the Attack ofJuly 23 a War Crime?

As discussed above, the conflict of the al-Aqsa Intifada satisfies
the two elements shared by all war crimes under the Rome Statute: that
the conduct took place during international armed conflict and that the
perpetrator was aware of the existence of an armed conflict, such that
his or her actions "took place in the context of and was associated with"
the conflict. 199 The Israeli government considers the al-Aqsa Intifada
international armed conflict. 200 The remainder of this subsection will
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 7(1)(a).
See text supra Part IIl.A.1.ii.
See id., A.1.ii & iii.
See Middle East Policy Council, supra note 19.
See text supra Parts Ill.A.1. ii & iii.
Bassiouni, supra note 137, at 245 .
See text supra Part II, III.A. I .ii.
See text supra Part II.
Id.
See text supra Part Ill.A. I.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19; Report, supra note 49, at 38.
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explore whether the attack of July 23 satisfies the remaining elements of
the relevant war crimes.
i. Willful Killing

The war crime of willful killing requires that the perpetrators, the
members of the Israeli government who planned the attack on
Shehadeh, intended to kill one or more protected persons who belonged
to an adverse party to the conflict. 201 International humanitarian law
broadly defines protected persons as those whom "at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals. " 202 Palestinian civilians fall within the
class of protected persons. 203 There is no dispute over Israel's intentions
in commissioning the attack of July 23, 2002. An Israeli governmental
inquiry into the attack targeting Shehadeh for assassination found the
"operational assessments" of the professional military attack to be
"correct and professional. " 204
The government of Israel argues that "[i]nternational law in
general and the law of armed conflict in particular recognizes that
individuals who directly take part in hostilities cannot then claim
immunity from attack or protection as innocent civilians."205 Following
this position, Shehadeh's previous participation in Hamas terrorism
renders him a legal target for execution regardless of whether he was
participating in armed conflict at the time of the attack. However, this
position is not consistent with international law. As discussed above,
under Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions, civilians only lose their protection against armed attack
while they are taking a direct part in hostilities. 206 The interdictions
against attacking civilians apply at all other times. 207 This is not to argue
that Israel was prohibited from apprehending and putting Shehadeh on
trial. International humanitarian law merely prohibits Israel from
committing the war crime of willful killing. Moreover, putting aside the

201. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(a)(i).
202. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 4.
203. Convention on Protection of Civilians in War, supra note 172, at art. 4. The
Commentaries state that "there are two main classes of protected persons: (1) 'enemy
nationals' ... and (2) 'the whole population' of occupied territories (excluding nationals of
the Occupying Powers)." Id.
204. Inquiry, supra note 10.
205. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19.
206. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
207. Id.
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issue of whether Shehadeh was a legitimate target, the attack occurred
despite the Israeli government's knowledge of Shehadeh' s wife Leila
Safira's presence at the time and place of the attack. 208 There is no
dispute over whether Safira was a civilian, and, as such, she was
protected under international humanitarian law.
ii. Attacking Civilians

The war crime of attacking civilians requires the perpetrators to
intentionally direct an attack at civilians, who are not taking direct part
in hostilities. 209 The intent to kill civilians is evidenced by Israel's
acknowledgment that it intended to kill Shehadeh and his wife at a time
when neither was an active part in military operations against Israel. 210
Israel consistently states that it intends to target only those
responsible for acts of terrorism, and works to prevent any civilian
deaths as a result of these actions. 211 Setting aside the status of
Shehadeh and his wife in the instant attack, the official Israeli statement
that "the timing [of the attack] . . . would have been changed" had the
government known of the presence of civilians seems incredulous after
observing that Israel used a F-16 warplane to launch an evening missile
attack upon a three-story apartment building in a crowded
neighborhood. 212 The likeliness of this sort of attack to kill unintended
civilians becomes apparent after considering that untargeted civilians
make up at least 30-35% of the persons killed during these attacks. 213
Additionally, 27 Israeli Air Force reserve pilots signed a petition in
September 2003 refusing "to participate in air force attacks on civilian
populations."214 The pilots declared that they "refuse to continue
harming innocent civilians."215 Therefore, the missile strike on a
Palestinian apartment building which killed fifteen civilians on July 23
was an instance of the war crime of attacking civilians.

208. See Dudkevich, supra note 50.
209. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(i).
210. See Dudkevich, supra note 50; see text supra Part III.B.1.i.
211. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19 (stating that "[Israel] takes care to
target only those responsible for the violence, and continues to do its utmost to prevent
collateral civilian injury or loss of life").
212. See supra Part II. See also supra note 4 7.
213. See Dudkevitch supra note 50.
214. Greg Myre, 27 Israeli Reserve Pilots Say They Refuse to Bomb Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at Al2.
215. Id.
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iii. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage

Finally, the attack of June 18 would satisfy the elements of the war
crime of excessive incidental death, injury or damage. The standard
requires the perpetrator to launch an attack with the knowledge that the
attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians to such an
extent as to "be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated."216 This standard requires the
attack to be proportional to the military objective. The illegality of
Shehadeh as a target at the time of the attack notwithstanding, a fighterjet attack upon an apartment building known to be populated by
civilians, which was aimed at killing a single individual, is
disproportionate to the objective of stopping a single individual from
commissioning future terrorist attacks.
iv. Officials from the First Bush Administration

David Rivkin and Lee Casey have defended Israel's July 23 attack
as being proportional to the threat posed by Shehadeh. 217 They argued
that "Israel's attack ... on Salah.Shehadeh, [which resulted in a number
of civilian casualties], was legally justified because Shehadeh was a
highly important Hamas commander, responsible for numerous attacks
on Israeli targets."218 However, the authors seem to be arguing that the
attack upon Shehadeh was legally justified in order to prevent future
attacks on Israeli targets, or that the perpetrators of the attack were
acting in self-defense. Participation in defensive actions against
aggression is not a valid justification for the commissioning of war
crimes. 219 In Prosecutor v. Kordic and Prosecutor v. Cerkez, the ICTY
Trial Chamber rejected the justification of self defense for war crimes
committed by Bosnian Croats acting against a policy of Muslim
aggression. 220 The Court noted that "the involvement of a person in a
'defensive operation' does not 'in itself constitute a ground for
excluding criminal responsibility," emphasizing that "military
operations in self-defence do not provide a justification for serious
violations of international humanitarian law."221

216. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv).
217. David B. Rivkin et al., Suicide Attacks are War Crimes, Targeted Killings Aren't,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 8, 2002. Lee Casey is not related to the author.
218. Id.
219. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 223.
220. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, at para. 448-51, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
221. Id. at para 452.
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2. Was the Attack ofJuly 23 a Crime Against Humanity?
The argument may be made that the attack of July 23 was an
instance of the crime against humanity applicable to acts of murder. The
Rome Statute requires three elements for the crime against humanity of
murder. The first, that "[t]he perpetrator killed one or more persons," is
satisfied. 222 The second element, the attack "was committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population,"
is also satisfied. 223 The term "widespread or systematic" both excludes
spontaneous or uncontrolled group conflict and requires the element of
"policy" for non-state actors. 224 As discussed above, the Israeli
government's use of targeted assassination is neither spontaneous nor
uncontrolled group conflict, but instead it is a State policy. 225 The
attacks were also directed against civilian populations. In the instant
case, Shehadeh was not a military target under international
humanitarian law. 226 The military admitted knowledge that Shehadeh's
wife was present. 227 Moreover, the target was a crowded apartment
building. 22 The third element requires the perpetrators to have the mens
rea of knowingly carrying out these attacks in a widespread or
systematic nature. 229 This element is also fulfilled due to Israel's use of
the tactic of assassination as part of its counter-terrorist activities.
Israel's government could have chosen to arrest Shehadeh. Instead, the
government chose to launch a missile attack on an apartment building,
leaving fifteen civilians dead.
There is a strong argument that Israel's crime was not severe
enough to rise to the level of a crime against humanity. Crimes against
humanity are deprived of the protection of international human rights
law, and as such are reserved for those offenses which are of such
extreme gravity that they offend human dignity. 230 These crimes carry a
stigma not attached to war crimes. 231 Israel targets militants for
assassination who are members of groups, which the Israeli government
believes threaten the lives of Israeli civilians. While its policy of
222. Elements of Crimes, supra note I05, art. 7(I)(a)(l).
223. See discussion supra Part III.A. I .ii; Elements of Crimes, supra note I 05, at art.
7(1)(a)(2).
224. Bassiouni, supra note 138, at 245.
225. See supra Part I.
226. See supra Part III.A. I .ii.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See discussion supra Parts III.A. I .ii &.iii.
230. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 65-66.
231. See text supra Part 11.B.
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assassinations contravenes international humanitarian law, it is
debatable whether the policy has risen to the level of savagery where its
authors should be stigmatized as offending human dignity, despite the
fact that the crime fulfills the three elements of the crime against
humanity of murder. In the end, a judge should weigh these facts in
determining the guilt or innocence of those who carry out policies that
target civilians.
IV. DISCUSSION

The suicide bombing attack of June 18, 2002 and the extrajudicial
killing of July 23, 2002 were both serious violations of international
law. The Hamas attack targeted civilians, while the Israeli attack
targeted an individual, despite the awareness that civilian deaths were
extremely likely to result. Both attacks killed a large number of
innocent civilians who were not involved in the armed conflict. Both
left scores of grieving relations vowing to continue the chain of violence
that has characterized the al-Aqsa Intifada.
Some commentators have vehemently rejected describing the
Israeli government's policy of targeted killings as war crimes while
labeling suicide bombings as such. Rivkin and Casey have attacked
attempts to equate suicide bombings with extrajudicial killings, arguing
that such efforts serve "to legitimize terror as a form of warfare, [while]
impairing the ability of law-abiding States to use force to protect
themselves. "232 They distinguish the two by arguing that only known
military targets were attacked, and that civilian buildings such as homes
may become military targets if used for military purposes. 233 The
civilian deaths which often accompany targeted killings are excused as
being due to the "fog of war" or "faulty intelligence."234 However, as
discussed above, this distinction does not excuse these violations of
international humanitarian law. 235 Suicide bombings are war crimes and
crimes against humanity because the perpetrators target civilians.
Hamas' s arguments that suicide bombings actually strike military
targets because of the chance of hitting an off-duty soldier do not serve
as legal justification for these crimes. 236 Similarly, even if the targets of
the extrajudicial killings were legitimate, attacking civilian targets,
where a high rate of civilian deaths are extremely likely, is not justified
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Rivkin et al., supra, note 217.
Id.
Id.; Dudkevitch, supra note 50.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A. I .ii.
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by the chance of killing a suspected terrorist.
Two recent student notes have also argued that Israel's policy of
targeted killings is permissible under international law because the
policy is not assassination as traditionally defined under customary
international law, and the policy is legitimate under the doctrine of
anticipatory self defense. 237 The first argument can be disposed of by
noting that whether or not Israel's policy of targeted killings should be
defined as one of assassination is irrelevant; Israel is obliged to follow
international humanitarian law when engaging in armed conflict with
Palestinian militants. 238 The second argument, that a State may act in
preemptive self defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
may also be dispatched quickly. 239 Accepting arguendo that there exists
a right to preemptive self-defense, that right would not be unlimited.
Even armed conflict undertaken in self-defense must follow the precepts
of international humanitarian law, including those prohibiting attacks
where civilian deaths are extremely likely. 240
Both suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings are serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Stating this does not
legitimize terror as a form of warfare, nor impair the ability of lawabiding States to protect themselves. However, it implies that the
perpetrators of these actions should be held accountable. Prosecution of
the members of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities who have
promoted these policies is unlikely, given the present political situation.
However, perhaps the open and frank discussion of what these acts truly
are can lead to an acknowledgment of the unacceptability of these
tactics, leading to a point in the future where the perpetrators of these
war crimes and crimes against humanity are no longer left
unaccountable.
CONCLUSION

Nizin Jamjoum's death by a stray bullet was a random occurrence
directly linked to the chain of violence in Israel and Palestine. She was
one of the over 3,800 victims of the al-Aqsa Intifada. As her death left a

237. J. Nicholas Kendall, Recent Development, Israeli Counter Terrorism: "Targeted
Killings" Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069 (2002); Benjamin A. Gorelick,
Current Development, The Israeli Response to Palestinian Breach of the Oslo Agreement, 9
NEW ENG. J. lNT'L& COMP. L. 651, 665 (2003).
238. Kendall, supra note 237, at 1070-78; Gorelick, supra note 237, at 669-70; see
supra Part II.
239. Kendall, supra note 237, at 1078-88; Gorelick, supra note 237, at 665-66.
240. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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grieving brother vowing revenge, the attacks of June 18 and July 23
2002, which led to the sequence of events that caused her death,
similarly left scores of grieving relatives who will ensure that the
violence continues.
Nations worldwide are dealing with the quandary of how to
prevent terrorism without eroding individual protections granted by law.
The prohibition against the commissioning of war crimes, even in the
battle against terror, must serve as a bulwark past which no further
erosion may occur. International humanitarian law is the international
community's legal protection against the excesses of war. Its
observance strengthens the whole of the body of nations. International
humanitarian law also provides an individual's only legal protection
when war has destroyed the protections provided by local governments.
No one should suffer an abject death. Nizin Jamjoum deserved better.
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